Yingchen Wang

Research Abstract:

Hardware security beyond the CPU core and below the microarchitecture layer The execution of a user program relies on a stack of abstraction layers, ranging from algorithm to analog. Software security relies on a hardware-software contract that every layer in the stack does not leak. However, modern hardware is deployed with undocumented, software-transparent microarchitecture (uarch) optimizations that can lead to unexpected vulnerabilities in practice. The security community started the investigation of hardware data leakages in the CPU cache, and already spent more than two decades on it. The CPU cache still matters but the bigger, compact and heterogeneous modern hardware opens up new challenges. While data containing secrets flows across components and layers, the community has paid limited attention to the potential leakage beyond the CPU core and below the uarch layer. I am expanding security beyond the CPU core. I am expanding security below the uarch layer. I examine data leakages within understudied components and layers that were once believed to have no influence on the security of user-space software.

Bio:

Yingchen Wang is a fifth-year Ph.D. student at The University of Texas at Austin, under the guidance of Professor Hovav Shacham. Yingchen’s research interests lie in hardware security and applied cryptography, where she explores the security implications of modern hardware beyond the CPU core and below the microarchitecture layer. Her work was selected as an IEEE Micro Top Picks in 2023 and won the Black Hat Pwnie Award for Best Cryptographic Attack in 2022. Before joining UT Austin, she received a B.S. in Computer Science and a B.S. in Physics from The University of Southern California.